A discourse sl,'ategy is a strategy lor communicaling wilh ~motller agenl. Designing elli:clive dialogue syslems requires designing agents that can choose among discourse strategies. Wc claim that file design of effective sIfalegies must lake cognilive laclors into account, propose a new melhod for lesling Ihe hypothesized factors, and present experimental results on an effective strategy for stlpporting deliberation. 'File proposed method of compulational dialogue simulation provides a iiew empirical basis 1+Ol + computalional linguislics.
Introduction
A discourse slralegy is a strategy for communicaling with another agent. Agents make slrategy choices via decisions abotlt whetl 1o talk, when 1o let tile olher agenl talk, wllal Io say, aiR[ how to say il. ()no choice a COllVelSitliOllal i:lgelll lnllst make is whether ~ltl utterance sholdd include some relev~ml, but Olllional, information in what is communicated. For ex~unple, consider 1: 1) a. Let's walk along Wahlut St. b. ll's shorter.
The speaker made a shategic choice in 1 to include lb since she could have simply said la. What detemlines the speaker's choice?
Existing dialogue systems have two modes lot dealing with optional inlormalion: (1) includeall optional inlormatiou thai is not already known lo the he, e'er; (2) include no optional inlommlion IMoore and l'aris, 19931. Bul Ihese modes are simply the extremes of possibility ~md Io my knowledge, no l)revious work has proposed any principles for when Io include oplional fillornmtion, or any way of lesting the i)roposcd l/rinciples lo see how lhey are affecled by the conversants and their processing ahilities, by the task, by tile COtTllntlnication channel, or by the domain.
This lmper presenls a new experimeillal melhod for determining whelher a discourse strategy is effective and presents experimenlal results on a slralegy for supporling deliberalion. Tile ntethod is b~tsed on earlier simulation work by Carletla and Pollack ICarletla, 1992; Pollack ~md Ringuelle, 1990] . Section 2 outlines hypotheses about the factors that affect which strategies are effective. Section 3 presenls a new inelhod for testing lhe role el'the *This research was parlially futlded by AR() grant I)AAI A) J,-gg-C0031PI.~I and 1 )A RPA grant N00014-90-J-1863 at Ihe University o f l'ennsylwmia and by [ lewlcit l'ackard, U.K. hypothesized factors. "File experimental results in section 4 show that effective stralegies 1o supporl deliberation are determined by bolh cognilive and lask variables.
2 Deliberation ill l)iscourse l)Niberation is file process by which an agent decides what to believe and what to tit> [G~dliers, 199 l; Doyle, 19921 . ()he slralegy that supports deliberation is the ExpliciI-Warrant strategy, as in 1. The WARRANT in lb can be used by the he~uer in deliberating whether lo ACCEPT or REJIi(?T tile speakef's I'ROPOSAI, in la. 1
An amdysis of proposals in a corpus of 55 problemsolving dialogues SllOWS lhat communicating agents don't always include warrants in a prol)osal, and suggest a number of hypolheses abotlt which factors alfecl lheir decision I Walker, 1993; Pollack el al., 19821. Consider a situalion in which an agent A w~mts ~u~ agent B to accept a proposal P. If B is a 'helpful' agent (llOllaHl.Ol)Ol/lOtlS), B will accepl A's proposal withoul a wammt. Altemalively, if B deliberates whether to accept 1; but B knows of no competing options, Ihen P will be the best el)lion whether or not A lells P, the WatW~Ult lor P. Since a w~u','ant makes the dialogue longer, tile Explicit-Wml'~mt strategy might be inefficient whenever either of these situalions hold. Now consi(lel a silualiOll where P, is HI) atltOllOlllO|lS agenl I Galliers, 19911. B always deliberates every proposed and B probably knows of oplions which compete with proposal P. Then B c~umot decide whelher to accept P withoul a warrant. Supposedly agenl A should omit a warrant is if it is ah'eady believed by B, so that the speaker in 1 woukl not have said It's shorter if she believed that the hem'or knew that file Wahlul St. mute was shorter. However, consider 2, said in discussing which Indian reslaurant to go to for hmch:
(2) a. Listen to Ramesh. b. tle's lndiau.
The w~m~Ult in 217 was included despite tile facl that il was cOlnlllOll knowledge ;llllOng lhe COl)VelSalltS. Its inclusion violates the rule of Don't tell people facts that they already k#tow. ~= Clearly lhe rule does not hold. I The telalion between a WARRANT and the PR(II,OSI{ COlllmunicative act is similar to the MOTIVATION relation of [Moore and Paris, 1993; Mann and Thompson, 1987] . A WARRANT is always optional; this is consistent with the RST fl'anlewolk in which all satellites are optional information.
2The WARRANT having lhe desired cflect of getting the hearer io listen to l{amesh depends till ltle hearel previously believing or coming Io believe that hldians know of good Indian restaurants [Webber arid ]oshi, 19921. [Prince, 1981; Baddelcy, 1986] . 11 the w~u'rant is not already salient, then B must either infer or retrieve the wlurant information or obtain it from an external source in order to evaluate A's proposed. Thus A's slrategy choice may depend oil A's model of B's alteutional stale, as well as the costs of retrieval ~md inference as opposed to communication. In other words, A may decide thal it is e~Lsier to just say the warrant rather than require B to infer or retrieve it.
Finally, the task determines whether there are penalties lor leaving a w~ur~mt implicit and relying on B 1o inter or relrieve it. Some tasks require that two agents agree oil tile reasons lot adopting a proposal, e.g. in order to ensure robustness in situations of environmental change. ()ther tasks, such ~ts a mmmgement/union negotiation, only require the agents to agree on the actions to be cluried out and each agent can have its own reasons lot wanting tl~ose actions to be done withoul affecting success in the lask. Figure 1 summ~uizes these hypotheses by proposing a hypothetical decision lree for an agent's choice of whetlmr to use the Explicit-W~n-rlmt strategy. The choice is hypothesized to depend oil cognitive properties of B, e.g. what B knows, B's anentiomd state, lind B's processing capabilities, as well as properties of the tiksk and the communication cl~annel. To my knowledge, all previous work on di~dogne has simply assumed that ,'m agent should never tell ~m agen! facts that the other agent already knows. The hypotheses in figure 1 seem coinpie[ely plausible, but the relationship of cognitive effort to dildogue behavior has never been explored. Given these hypotheses, what is required is a way to test the hypothesized relationship oft~tsk and cognitive factors to effective discourse strategies. Section 3 describes a new method for testing hypotheses about ellective discourse stralegies in dialogue.
Design.World
Design-World is an experimentld enviro|unent for testiug the relationship hetween discourse strategies, task p~u'ameters ,and agents' cognitive capabilities, similar to the single ,agent TileWorld simnlalion environment [Pollack and Ringuette, 1990; Hanks et al., 199311. Design-World agents can be parametrized as to discourse strategy, and tilt elfecls of this strategy can he me~Lsured against a |'imge of cognitive and task p~u'ameters. This paper compares [l~e Explicit-Winrant strategy to the All-lmplicil strategy as strategies lot supporting deliberation. Other strategies tested in Design-World me presented elsewhere [W~dker, 1993; Walker, 1994a; Riunbow ~md Walker, 19941. 3.1 Design World l)omain and task To negotiale all ;-tgxec.lllt3nt, each agetll c:uTics ()tit means-end reasoning itl)oul tile furniture pieees Ihat Ihey hilve thal Call be used izl lhe lloof plan. Means-elld reasoning generates OPTIONS these options are tile content o1: I'I{OI'()SAI2q Io Ihe other agent to 1,1 IT iI piece of fumitufeinlooneoftherooms. Dialogue 3 ilhlstratesagents' communication for part el desiguing loom-l, including bolh tile aflilicial lallgtlage lhaI the agents conlnitmicate wilh and a gloss generated li'om 1hal llmgl,age in italics:
(3) 1 : ITIl,[,: First, lel's put lhe green rug in the study.
(p,olmSC agent, hill agenl.kinl optima. 10: pill acl (agent-bill ff3eet/ l~lg fclonl 1 )) 2: KIM: Nexl, lefs pill the .wee, htm t) there. 2:(propose agcnt-kim agent-bill {~plion-33: put-act (a~,entkim green lamp room-Ill 3: BILL: Then, leFs put the green cotwh in the study.
(propose. agent-bill agcnt-kim option-45: put-act (agenr bill green Cmlch mOln-1 )) 4: KIM: No. instead let's put in the purl)le ~ om:h.
(rcjecl agcnt-kim agent bill o1~1ion-55: lnlt acl (agent kml purple couch l'OOlll-[ )) ()n receiving a proposal, au agent dcliberalcs whclhcf I() ACCI!I'T ,:51 R10ECT tile proposal [Doyle, 1992] . As po-Ielllial warfants to suppofl deliberation, ~md It.) provide a wily of ohjeclively evaluating agents' l)erlbrm~mce, each piece of l:ufnitufe has a score. The score ira)positions lor all tile pieces of furniture are stored in both agents' memories al Ihe beginning of lhe dialogue.
Agents RI{JI,'.( :'ra proposal if delibefalion leads lhenl 1o believe lhal lhey know t)l'a bellm option or if they believe the precondilions for tile proposal do not hold. The contoni of rt~jc.clions is dctcf,nined by the (:()I.I.AI;()RKI'IV){ PI.ANNIN(; PRIN('II'IJ{S, abslfacled frolll analyzing fotlf different types oF pt'oblem solving dialogues [Walker and Whitlakef, 1990; Walker, 1994bJ . Per example, in 3-4 Kiln fejecls the proposal ill 3-3, and gives its her reason that oplion-S6 is a teenier-proposal, Pml)osals 1 aiRl 2 ~ue infeffed Io be implicilly Act 3.;HE]) because they are not rejected [Walker ~md Whiltaker, 1991) ; Walker, 19921. I1 a pfOl)OSal is A(:t'EI'Tt,.'I), eilhef implicitly or explicitly, then the oplion Ihat wits Ihe content of tile pfoposal hecollles a mtnlual intenlitm thai conlrihutes Io Ihe iinal design plan II 'ower, 1984; Sidner, 1992I . A polenlial final design plan negolialed via a dialogue is shown in ligure 2.
3.2
Varying l)iscourse Slrategies The l)esign-Wodd experimenls reporlcd here compare 1he All-hnplicit slratcgy with the ExpliciI-Wmrant strategy. Agcnls are paianmlrized for difl~:renl discot,rsc strategies by placing different expansions o1' discourse phms in their plan libfaries. I)iscoufsc plans m'e plans for The Explieit-Wmf~mt slralegy expands lhe I'ROI'()SAI. discourse act to be a WAId<ANT followed by a PR()I'OSE utter~mee. Since agents already know tile point values for pieces of furniture, wm'rauts ~ue Idways IRUs ill lhe experimenls here. For exmnple, 4-1 is a WARRANT for the pn)posal ill 4+2: The n~unes of agents who use tile Explicit-Win-rant smltegy are a numbered version of tile siring "IEI" to help the experimenter keep track of tile simulation data tiles; IEI stlmds lor hnplicit acceptance, Explicil warrant, Implicit opening ~md closing.
FI)
[: let: lhxtting in the green rug is worth 56.
(say agcnt-iei agent ici2 bel.-10: scm'c (option..[0: put-act (aEelli-iei green mg room-I ) 56)) 2: IEt: Then, let's i;,ut the green rug it* the study.
(pmlmSe agent-iei agenViei2 {q~lion .10: put-acl (age,ll iei green tug romu-I ))
3: IEI2: Pulling ill lhe green laml~ is wol'th 55.
(say agent-iei2 agent-ici bvl 34: score (optiOll 33: put-acl (agent ici2 ~,leell lamp room-1) 55) ) 4: IE12: Then, let's put the green lamp in lhe study.
(Ismp-sc agcnl-iei2 agc.nt-ici optitm-.33: puVacI (aget~t-ici2 green lamp teen> 1 ))
The fact lhal the green rile is worth 56 points suppolls deliberation about wlmlhet 1o adopt the intention of putting the green rug in the study. The I~xplicit--WalTall[ sirategy models nalurally oceun'ing examples such as those in 2 because Ihe points illfofmalitm used by lhe hem'er to deliberate whether to accept or reject the proposal is already mulually believed.
Cognitive and 'lask i'arametevs
Seclion 2 inlfoduced a range of factors motivated by the coqms analysis that were hypothesized to determine when ExpliciI-Wm-fant is an efleelive slralegy. This seclion discusses how Design-World SUl)ports Ihc plu'iunetfization of these [~ICIOfS.
The agent architecture R/r deliberalion and means-end reasoning is based on the IRMA architeclure, also used in the 'l-'ile, World simulation environment IPollack and R.inguclte, 19901, with Ihe addition of a model o1' lira-ile(l Allenlkm/Working IllellIOfy, AWM, [Walker, 1993] inchldes a fullef disctlssion of tile l)esig,>WorM deliberation and melms-end reasoning mechanism and Ihe underlying mechanisms assumed in collaborative planning.
We hypolhcsizcd lhal a warrant Inllsi be ,'qAIJENT for hoth agents (as shown by example 2). In l)esign-Wodd, salience is modeled by AWM model, adapted lronl [Landauer, 1975 I. While the AWM model is extremely sin> pie, [,andauer showed thai it could be pm'ameterized lo 1il many empirical resells on human memory and learning [Baddeley, 19861 . AWM consists of a three dimensional slsace in which propositions acquired Dora perceiving the world are stored in chronological sequence according 1o tile localion o1' a moving memory pointef. The sequence of memory loci iised lof slotage constitutes a fI.Itldolll walk lhrough memory wilh each loci a shorl dislance lfonl tile previous one. If items are encountefed illtllliple times, they me stored nmlliple limes [Itinlzmann and Block, 1971] .
Whell }Ill agellt rchieves ilenls 1}o111 inelllOfy, search slarls from tile current poinlef Iocalion and spreads out in a spherical fashion. Search is restricted to a particular se,'u'ch radius: radius is defined in Hiunming distance. For ex~unple if the current memory pointer loci is (0 0 (1), the loci dist~mce 1 away would be (0 1 0) (0 -1 0) (0 0 l) (0 0 -1) (-1 0 0) (1 0 0). The actual locations are cldculated modulo the memory size. The limit on the search radius defines the capacity of attention/working memory and hence defines which stored beliefs and intentions are SAI ,IENT.
Thc radius of tile search sphere in the AWM model is used as the par,'uneter for Design-World agents' resource-bound on attentional capacity. In the experiments below, memory is 16x16x16 and tile radius parmneler v~n'ies between 1 and 16, where AWM of 1 gives severely attention limited agents imd AWM of 16 means that everything an agent knows is accessible. 3 This parluneter lets us distinguish between an agent's ability to access all the inlimnation stored in its memory, lind the effort involved in doing so.
The advantages of the AWM model is that it was shown to reproduce, in simulation, mlmy results on human memory ~md lem'ning. Because search st~n'ts from the current pointer location, items that have been stored most recently are more likely to be retrieved, predicting recency effects [BMdeley, 19861. Because items that are stored in multiple locations are more likely to be retrieved, tbe model predicts fiequency effects [Hiutzmmm and Block, 1971 I. Because items are stored in chrono-IogicN sequence, the model produces natural associativity effects [Landaner, 19751. Because deliberation and means-end re~tsoning can only operate on salient belietls, limited attention produces a concomitlmt inl)rential limitation, i.e. if a belief is nol salient it cannot be used in deliberation or mcans-end-reltsoniug. This means that mistakes that agents make in their planning process have a plansible cognitive basis. Agents can both fail to access a belief that would idlow them to produce ,an optim~d plan, its well as make a mistake in pl~mning if a belief about bow the world has changed its a result of pllmning is not sldicnt. I)epending on the preceding discourse, and the agent's attentionld capacity, the propositions that im agent knows may or may not be salient when a proposed is made.
Another hypothetical riveter was the relative cost of retrievld and communication. AWM ~dso gives ns a way to measure tile nmnber of retriev~ds from memory in terms of tile number of locations searched to find a proposition. The iunount of effort required li)r each retrieval step is a parmnetel, its is tile cost of each inference step lind the cost of each communicated message. These cost parluneters supporl modeling v~uious cognilive mchitectures, e.g. vmying tile cost of retrieved models different assumptions ahout memory. For example, if retrieval is free then ~dl items in working memory me instfmtly accessible, as they would be if they were stored in registers with litst p~uallel access. If AWM is set to 16, but relrievzd isn't free, tile model approximates slow spreading 3The size of memory was determined as adequate for pro ducing the desired level ~1' variation in tile current task across all the experimental variables, while slill making it possible to I' 1.1 n a large iltlnlher el" simtllalions over night wherl agents have access to all of their memory. In order Io use the AWM model in a different task, the experimenter might want to explore dilferent sizes lbr memory. activation that is quite effortful, yet the agent still has the ability to access ~dl of memory, given enough time. If AWM is set lower than 16 ~md retrievld isn't liee, then we model slow spreading activation with a timeout when e/fort exceeds a certain ~unount, so that im agent does not have the ability to access all of memory.
It does not make sense to fix absolute v~dues li)r the retrievld, inference lind communication cost plu~uncters in relation to human processing. However, Design-World supports exploring issues about the relative costs of vlu'ions processes. These relative costs might v,'u'y depending,on the language that the agents are communicating with, properties of the communication channel, how smtu't tile agents ,arc, how much time they have, lind what the demands of the ti~sk are [Norm~m and Bobrow, 1975] . Below we vary tile relative cost of communication and retrieval.
Fin~dly, we hypothesized that the Explicit-Wm3'ant strategy may be beneficial if the relationship betweeu the wlm'imt and the proposed must be mutu~dly believed. Thus the delinition of success for the task is a Design-World plu','uneter: the Stimd~u'd task does not require a shared wlu'r~mt, whereas the Zero NonMatching Beliefs task gives a zero score to any negotiated plan without agreed-upon warrants.
Evaluating Perfiwmance
qb evlduate PERFOI),MANCti, We compare the Explicit-Winximt strategy with tbe All-Implicit strategy in situations where we vm'y the tltsk requirements, agents' attcntiotud capacity, lind the cost of retrieval, inference and communication. Evlduation of tile resulting I)ESIGN-IIOtJSli plan is p~u'~unctrized by (1) RAW S(:ORE is task specilic: ill the Stand'ud task we simply summiu'ize the point values of the furniture pieces in each PUT-A('T ill the fined Design, while in tile Zero NonMatching Beliefs task, agents get no points for a pllm unless they agree on the reasons underlying each action that contributes to the plan.
The way I'ERFORMANCI! is defined reflects the litct that agents m'e me,'mt to collaborate on the tlksk. The costs that ~u'e deducted liom tbe RAW SCORE are the costs for both agents' communication, inference, m~d retrieval. Thus PERFORMANCE is a measnre of LEAS'I" COLI,ABORATIVE EFFORT [Cl~u'k and Scbaeler, 1989; Brennan, 19901 . Since the par~uneters for cognitive ef-lk~rt iu'e fixed while discom'se strategy and AWM settings iue vltried, we can directly test the benefits of different discourse strategies under different assumptions ~d)ont cognitive effort and Ihe cognitive demands of the task. This is impossible to do with corpus imldysis alone.
We simulate 100 dildogues at each pmiuncter setting lk)r each strategy. Differences in perfimnance distributions ~u'e ewduated l'or significance over the 100 dialogues using the Kohnogorov-Smimov (KS) two siunple test I Siegel, 1956 I.
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A strategy A is I~F.NI:,FiCIAI, as compmcd to a strategy B, for a sel of lixed parameter settings, if the diflerence in distributions using the Kobnogorov-Smirnov two sample test is signilicmlt at p < .05, in the positive direction, for two or more AWM settings. A slrategy is DETRI-MI!N'IAI, if tile differences go in tile negalive direction. Slratcgics may be neither BENF, FICIA1, or I)ETRIMF, NTAI,, as lhere may be no dillerence between two strategies.
Results: Explicit Warrant
This section discusses the results of compm'ing the Explicit-Wmranl discourse strategy with the All-Implicit discotuse slrategy to determine when each slralegy is BENEH(:IAI,. We test 4 factors outlined in figure 1 : when the wal'rlull is salient or nol, when the w~u'falll is required for the task or not, when the cosls of retrieval and communication vary, and when retrieval is indeterufinate.
Dilli~rences in performmlce between the Explicit-Warrallt slrategy and tile All-hnplicit slrategy ~ue shown via a I)IFFI2RI!NCE I'LOT such as ligme 3. In figure 3 pcrform~mce differences are plolled on the Y-axis and AWM seltings are shown on the X-axis. If the plot is above file dotted line for 2 or more AWM settings, then the Explicit-Warrant strategy may be IIENt{FI(:IAI, depending on whether the differences are signilic,'mt by the KS lest. Each point represents the difference in the means of 100 runs of each stralegy at a l)mticul~u" AWM selling. Those plots summarize the results of 1800 simulated dialogues: 100 lbr each AWM setting lot each stralegy. Dialogues in which one or both agents use the Explicit-Warrant strategy m'e more eflicient when relriev~d has a cost. Figure 3 shows that the Explicil-Wmr~mt strategy is I)HRIMI!NTAI, at AWM of 3,4,5 for the St~mdard lask, Figure 5 : lfCommuuication is Expensive: Communicalion costs c~ul dominate other costs in dialogues. Strategy i is two Explicit-Warrant agents ,'rod strategy 2 is two All-hnplicit agents: Task = Stmld,'u'd, commcost = 10, infcost = 0, retcost = 0 in compm'ison with tile All-hnplicit strategy, if relrieval fi'om memory is fi'ee (KS 3, 4, 5 > .19, p < .05) . This is because making the wammt salient displaces information about other pieces of furniture when agents m'e attention-limited. In the St,'uld~u'd t&sk, agents m'en't required to sh,'ue beliefs about the value of a proposed, so remembering what pieces they have is more importmlt than remembering their value. However, figure 4 shows that Explicit-Wm'rm~t is ben-elici~d when retrieval is one tenth tile cost of communication :rod inference. By AWM v,'dues of 3, performance wilh Explicit-W~u'rant is belier than All-Implicit because lhe beliefs necess~n'y for deliberation are made salienl with each proposal (KS lk)r AWM of 3 and above > .23, p < .01). At AWM parameter settings el' 16, where agenls have lhe ability to search all their beliefs lk)r warrants, the saving in processing time is substantial. Again at the lowest AWM seltings, the slrategy is not beneficial because it displaces information about other pieces fronl AWM. However in figure 4, in conlr&st wilh ligure 3, retrieval has an associated cost. Thus Iho savings in relriowtl balance out wilh the loss of raw score so that tile strategy is nol I]I!TRIMENTAI. ()ther experiments show that even when the relative cost of retrieved is .0001, that Explicit-Wanant is still benelicial at AWM settings of I 1 ~md 16 (KS Ik/r 11,16 > .23, p < .01) .
Explicit Wa,'rant reduces Retrievals

Explicit Warrant is detrimental if Communication is Expensive
If we ch~mge the relative cosls of the dillerent processes in the siluation, we change whether a strategy is benelicial. Figure 5 shows that if connnnnication cost is 10, ~md inlerence and rolrieval ~u'e li'ee, then the Explicit-Wlu'i'~nll strategy is DI,ITRIMI]N'IAL (KS for AWM 1 to 5 > .23, p< .01). This is because the Explicit-Warr~mt slralegy increases the number of ntter~mces required to perform Ihe task; it doubles the number of messages in every proposal. If communication is expensive compared to retrieval, communication cost can dominate the other benelits.
l!;xplicit Warrant Achieves a High Level of Agreement
If we change lhe dolinition of success in the ta:sk, we change whether a slrategy is benelicial. When the l&sk is Zero-Nouiilatching-Beliefs, the Explicit-W~u'ranl strategy is beneficial oven if retrieval is fiee (KS > .23 for AWM ll'onl 2 lo 11, p < .01)The warranl inl]Jrnlation that is redundantly provided is exactly tilt inlk)rmation that is needed in order to achieve inatching beliel\s about Ihe warranls for intended actions. Tile strategy virtually gu~u~nllees thai the agenls will agree on the re&sons l(/l' carrying onl a particular course of action. The fact that relrieval is indclcrminate produces this effect; a simihit resnll is oblained when wm'r~mls are required and relriewll costs someihing.
To my great surprise, Ihe benelicial effect of Explicit-W~uralll for the Zero-NonMatching-Beliefs task is so robust thal even if communication cost is 10 and reirieval and inference are fl+ee, Explicil-Warrant is better than AII-hnplicit at AWM of 3 •.. 11 (KS > .23, p < .0l). See ligure 6. In other words, even when every extra WARRANT message incurs a penalty of 10 poinls, if the task is Zero-NonMatching-Beliefs, agents using Explicit-W~u'rant do belier. Contrasl ligure 6 with the Standard t~tsk ~md s~une cost p~n'amelers in 5.
These result suggesls thai including w~u'rants is highly effective when agents must agree on a specilic w~ua~u/t, if lhey are atlenlion-limited to any extent. Figure6: Explicit-Warranl is STILL benelicial: Strategy 1 is two Explicit-W~u'ranl agents ~md slrategy 2 is two All-Implicit agents: qlisk = Zero-Nonmatching-Bcliel~s, commcost = 10, inl~;ost = (/, retcost = 0 to tile decision of when Io include a w:urant in a proposed. We showed thai w~ur~mts ~u'e useful when the task requires agreement on the warrant, when the win'rant is not currently s~dient, when retrieval of tile w~u-r~mt is indeterminate, or when retriewd has some associated cost, and that warranls hinder perfornlance if communication is costly ~uld if tim w~urant c~ul displace inli.)rnlation that is needed to complete the task, e.g. when AWM is very limited and wm'r[mts ~ue not required to be shared. Tile method used here is a new experimental methodelegy for computational linguistics that supports testing hypotheses about benelici~d disconrse strategies [Carletta, 1992; Pollack and Ringuelle, 1990] . The Design-World environment is b~tsed on a cognitive model of limited attention ~md supports experimenls on the interaction of discourse strategies with agents' cognitive limitations. The use of the method and the focns of lhis wtnk are novel: previous work has l~)CliSed Oil determining nnderlying mechanisnls £~r cooperative strategies rather than on investigating when a slrategy is elIective.
To my knowledge, no previous work on di;dogue l/~ts ever argued that conversational agents' resonroe limits are a lnajor factor in determining ¢IIective conversational strategies in collaboration. Tim resulls presented here suggest that cooperative strategies cannot be delhied in the abslracl, but cooperation arises from the interaction of two agents in dialogue. If one agent has limited working memory, then the ()thor agenl can make the di~doguc go more slnoothly by adopting a strategy that makes deliberative premises salient. In other words, slrategies ~ue cooperative for certain conversational p;u'tners, in/der particular task delinitions, lor p~uticul~u communicalion situations.
Here we compared two discourse strategies: Allhnplicit ~ul(l Explicit-Warr~mh Explicit-W;uranl is a type of discourse stralegy called ~m Attelition strategy in [W;dkel; 1993] because its main lunction is to manipulate agents' altenlional slate. Elsewhere we show that (1) some IRU strategies are only beneficial when inferential complexity is higher Ihall in the Standard "l,u,~k [R~unbow and Walker, 1994; Walker, 1994al;  (2) IRUs that make intL'rences explicit can help inlbrence limited agents perlorm as well as logic;ally omniscient ones I Walker, 199311.
Although much work remains to be done, there is reason to believe that these results are (Iomsdn independent. The simplicity of the Design-World task inemls thai its ,',;trllCttlr(.; is a stlbCOlllpOl/enl of malty other task,,,;. The model of limited resources is cognilively based, but the cosl pmameters support modeling diflcrent ageil[ archilectures, and we exl)h)red the effects of dilli:rent cost l)ar~unelers. The Exl)licil-WmTant strategy is b~used on simple relationships between different ihcls which we would expect to occur in any domain, i.e. the lact that some belief csm be ilsed sis a WARRANT fi)r accepting a l)roposal should occur in sdmost any task. Future work should extend these results, showing that a 'cooperative strategy' need not always be 'coopcralive', sut(l investigate additional factors thai determine when strategies me effective.
